Abstract: Although the integration processes in Western Europe have been studied for decades, the idea of European identity as a specific area of scholarship is relatively new. This interest coincides with fundamental changes that have occurred in Europe since 1989 and that may impact the internal coherence of the enlarged European Union. Over the past decades, the East-West dichotomy has been magnified due to the impact of Communism in the East, which exacerbated an already existent sense in the West of Eastern Europe's primordial otherness. Since four decades of Communism in East Central and Southern Europe produced only two, or at most, three generations that were raised and lived under a totalitarian regime, a long-term historical perspective is essential for a better understanding of the mutual estrangement. The paper examines the origins and key moments in the alienation of Eastern and Western Europe as reflected in ancient, medieval and modern history. It focuses on the present stage of perception of East Central Europe in the West. In the final part, it identifies societal values that may re-generate socio-cultural cohesiveness aimed at filling the gap between the two parts of Europe.
In 69 AD, in the year of the four emperors, when many tribal revolts against the central government in Rome multiplied the effects of civil war, Petilius Cerealis, the Roman legate, admonished the tribes of the Treviri and the Lingones, who were settled in the Rhine River valley, not to join in the rebellions with a speech containing the following words: "Everything else is shared equally between us…There is no question of segregation and exclusion." (Tacitus, Historiae IV, 74, 1968, 257) . In the mid-1990s, the Austrian authorities mounted a police operation aimed at controlling the country's frontiers with the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, in order to prevent an expected massive influx of illegal immigrants from the countries of the former Soviet Union and the Balkans on their road to the West. This operation was symptomatically named "Limes", accentuating its link to the old Roman frontier along the Rhine and Danube Rivers, whose purpose was to prevent incursions of barbarians into imperial territories. In 1999, on the occasion of the 10 th anniversary of the fall of another Limes -the Berlin Wall, the former President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, expressed the idea that "for the first time since the fall of the Roman Empire we have the opportunity to unite Europe -and this time it will not be by force of arms but on the basis of shared ideals and agreed common rules." (Jane Defence Weekly 1999, December 22). In both cases, the Roman Empire was the common denominator that framed the mindset of national as well as supranational executives in the West.
The Roman legacy, along with Hellenic culture and the Judeo-Christian spiritual tradition, is an obvious point of reference in the early history of Europe. Yet the history of the continent should not be reduced to the history of ancient Greece and Rome. For they were preceded by the core of existing civilization that comprised the Eastern Mediterranean as well as the Near East and the Aegean Sea. Under Rome, the civilized world (oikumene) inherited from the Hellenic peoples and their predecessors spread to the whole Mediterranean area (Dawson 1956, 26) . The importance of Rome was not in its having been a pioneer in the sphere of high culture, but in its having gradually become the politically unifying factor of the Mediterranean basin (Mare Nostrum) and large adjacent areas in Europe, Asia, and Africa. Virgil was perfectly aware of this priority as stressed in his proud admonition to his fellow citizens "Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento -But you Roman, remember, to rule the peoples with powers"-a maxim that reflected the primary mission of Rome, which was to rule and administer (Webster 1969, 274) . The centrifugal and universal character of Roman influence in all spheres of socio-cultural life in and around the Mediterranean helped to create a unique synthesis of the new type of oikumene-Imperium Romanum-as the very centre of western civilization (Palmer and Colton 1965, 9) .
The creation and further evolution of the Roman Empire already reflected an instant awareness of a cultural gap between South and North. In the first century AD, Tacitus referred to Germania, Britannia and North-Eastern Europe as the periphery of the civilized world. Three centuries later, to the last great Roman historian, Ammianus Marcellinus, the German tribes north of the Limes, while still a military threat, were already geographically, and also to some degree culturally, part of the Roman world (Marcellinus 1887) . With the shift of the centre of the Roman Empire from its western to its eastern part in the time of the emperors Diocletian and Constantine the Great at the beginning of the 4 th century AD, an "Eastern" perspective began to dominate the historiography of the late Roman Empire. Barbarian invasions in the 5 th century destroyed the cultural base of the West for centuries and only small isles of literacy, such as those saved by the Benedictine Order, survived. As Christopher Dawson accurately pointed out, "the leadership of culture had passed to the East and the 'Dark Ages' of western civilization coincide with the Golden Age of Byzantine and Islamic culture." (Dawson 1956, 96) .
Seven centuries after the fall of Rome, Anna Comnena, the daughter and historian of the Byzantine Emperor Alexios II, painted a vivid picture of events that transpired during the next phase of the East-West encounter. The crusades highlighted the ethno-cultural differences between the two different worlds. The "Celts" as Westerners were seen as "an exceptionally hot-headed race and passionate." When the Normans conquered Nicaea, an ancient and rich city of their ally, the Byzantine Empire, they behaved with such cruelty that they "cut in pieces some of the babies, impaled others on wooden spits and roasted them over the fire." Comnena bitterly concluded her observation with the following words: "The Latin race at all times is unusually greedy for wealth, but when it plans to invade a country, neither reason nor force can restrain it." (Comnena 1969, 311-312) .
Almost three centuries later, the last great historian of the dying Byzantine Empire, Laonikos Chalkokondyles still preserved the traditional ethno-geographical perception of the West on the shores of the Bosporus. The Celts, Dacians, Paions, Triballs, and Sarmats were the people he referred to as they were the same as in the time of Trajan and Constantine (Chalkokondyles 1988, 46-51) . These ethnics had already lived their lives for centuries under the names of Franks (French), Wallachians (Romanians), Hungarians, Serbs, and Muscovites (Russians). Both Komnena's and Chalkokondyles's accounts testify that the estrangement of the East from the West grew wider than it had been in the time of the unified Roman Empire.
The fall of Constantinople on May 29, 1453, and the rise of the Ottoman Turks to the status of a superpower significantly contributed to the existing divergence between West and East. From then on, the southern parts of the European and Mediterranean East were to be dominated by Islam. In the following three centuries, due to the Ottoman conquest of SouthEastern Europe, the religious conflicts between Catholicism and Protestantism in West and Central Europe, and the overall detrimental outcomes of the Thirty-Year War, both parts of Europe were kept busy with their own political and social problems and mutual perceptions, or rather indifference, and hibernated.
It was eventually the Enlightenment in Western Europe, hand in hand with economic progress that played a crucial role in shifting perspectives on Europe to favour the West. Montesquieu and Gibbon served as the primary agents of interpretations that refer to Western European superiority over a gradually degenerating East. In response to the analysis of ethnobehavioural characteristics given by Anna Komnena six centuries earlier, Gibbon referred repeatedly to the cowardice and treachery of the Greeks (Gibbon 1960, 720) thus countering the princess's references to the greediness and materialism of the Latins. Montesquieu commented on "the faintheartedness, laziness, and indolence of the nations of Asia [the Byzantine Empire] blended into religious devotion itself. (Montesquieu 1968, 203) . More recently, Peter Turchin elaborated upon the idea of "the intellectual tradition of dumping on the Byzantines [that] began in the eighteenth century with Edward Gibbon's book" (Turchin 2006, 77) . In his view, Gibbon and other figures of the Enlightenment thus appeared to be responsible for the shift to the present understanding of a Europe dominated by the West. The peculiarities of this shift from the East to the West in a long-term perspective were perfectly summarized by J. A. Pocock (2002, 60):
The geographical concept of "Europe" has moved to the West to the point where it defines an Atlantic peninsula by calling it a continent. Similarly, the historical concept of "Europe" has migrated, to the point where everything we mean when we say "the history of Europe" refers to the history of the political and religious culture-the highly distinctive civilization-that arose in the far-western Latin speaking provinces of the former Roman Empire. This has become what we mean by Europe. The lands to which the term Europa was originally applied-Thrace, Macedonia, Illyria, the more modern Bulgaria, Albania and Serbia-those which the Byzantine emperors considered their European "themes" or provinces-are in our minds only marginally European, inhabited by uncouth warring tribes whose history is not ours and whose problems are not of our business.
Oscar Halecki made a pertinent observation linked to the history of East Central Europe in the early 1950s. He pointed out that whereas Western Europe is frequently identified as a whole continent, interest in the Ottoman Empire and the Grand Principality of Muscovy, which after the fall of Constantinople viewed itself as the Third Rome, made them an inseparable part of Europe. What resulted was "a vast terra incognita of Europe: the eastern part of Central Europe, between Sweden, Germany and Italy, on the one hand, and Turkey and Russia on the other (Halecki 1952, 3) .
At present, it may seem peculiar that the geographical "heart" of Europe has frequently been cast as an unknown territory, or the "borderland", as in the time of the Roman Empire when the immense lands beyond the Limes were marked on maps with a warning for potential travellers and adventurers: hic sunt leones (here live the lions). Milan Kundera's famous exclamation on the cultural inseparability of Central Europe from the West and their togetherness may thus be seen not only as a passionate reaction to the devastating impact of Communism that brought to Central Europe an alien, Russo-Asiatic, culture, but also as an appeal stressing the region's common roots with its western neighbours of which all should be more aware (Kundera 1984) Modern history offers several examples of the fact that Central Europe, despite past and present political rhetoric, was not always the darling of the West, particularly in a time of political crisis. The syndrome of the political betrayal of Czechoslovakia that occurred in Munich in September 1938 and that was based upon its geo-cultural rejection as a "faraway country" of the "people of whom we know nothing," and which, to a certain extent, was repeated in the spring of 1968, during the Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia, has haunted intellectuals from Central Europe for decades. After the fall of Communism, the concept of East Central Europe as having been kidnapped from the West was quite understandably followed by a new one known as a "return to Europe", the most visible and prominent promoter of which was Václav Havel. The last president of Czechoslovakia and the first president of the Czech Republic went significantly farther than Kundera in his speech given before the Council of Europe in 1993 when he stressed his vision of Europe claiming that "the Western states should rid themselves of their subconscious drive for a dominant position in their own sphere of interests…they should stop trying to outwit history by reducing the idea of Europe to a noble backdrop against which they continue to defend their own petty concerns." (Moisio 2002, 104) . With that attitude Havel became the forerunner of the moral rhetoric of Central European states, known as the "applicant's state narrative" on their thorny road into Western-European and Euro-Atlantic organizations marked by jealousy, mutual accusations and extrication from themselves.
Not all of those who have emphasized the Westerness of East Central Europe have cared about the rest of the region, particularly the Balkans. Once part of Justinian's magnificent but short-lived reconquista-the Byzantine emperor's ambitious drive to resurrect the old glory of Rome in the 6 th century AD, which was repeated to a lesser extent by the Byzantine Emperor Basileos II in the 11 th century-the Danubian and Asian provinces of the Empire were culturally well-developed places that had no counterpart in the West. Between the 11 th and the beginning of the 13 th centuries, as Gibbon admitted, the armies of the crusaders passing by Constantinople "gazed with admiration on the capital of the East, or, as it should seem, of the earth, rising from her seven hills, and towering over the continents of Europe and Asia (Gibbon, 768) . In the classic movie The Lion in Winter (1968) , Henry II Plantagenet, the King of England, is seen going to give royal welcome to Philip II August, the King of France in 1183, by kicking hens off the stairs of his palace. This cinematographic scene displays the depth and length of cultural and material decline in the West that had followed after the fall of Rome and persisted for centuries. Until the beginning of the 14 th century a similar picture, with the exemption of rich merchant cities in North Italy and flourishing Moorish emirates in Spain, could easily have been found in royal places throughout Western Europe.
With economic progress and the emergence of a "capitalist core" in the West, which has been analyzed with great efficacy by Immanuel Wallerstein (1974), it was not until the last few decades of the 18 th century that the Balkans, a part of the Ottoman Empire that had begun slipping downhill, was geographically rediscovered by western travellers, and not until the Congress in Berlin in 1878 that politicians in the West made full acquaintance with its specificities. If the Enlightenment spurred romantic curiosity in the West about the Balkans, the Balkan wars at the end of the 19 th and the beginning of the 20 th centuries with their atrocities and mass-scale ethnic cleansing filled western audiences with disgust a century later. From that time onwards, a negative fixation on the Balkans, as underscored by Maria Todorova (1997) and André Gerolymatos (2001) , has remained deeply engrained in the western mind.
The civil war in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s triggered a new wave of reflexive thinking about the Balkans as the powder keg of Europe. The 1990s, while generally an era of increasing economic and political rapprochement with the West, paradoxically created new barriers within the East. The Visegrád countries, particularly the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, extricated themselves very explicitly from the Balkans as well as from Russia. Todorova bitterly claims that the Balkans have become a "new other" to Europe that is very closely associated with Russia (Todorova 1997, 160) . The masses' disillusionment in the postcommunist societies in East Central Europe with the slowly progressing and painful socioeconomic transformation, as well as western incursions in Serbia and Kosovo which were perceived by many as an anti-Slavic and pro-Muslim engagement. It revealed the weakness of the very idea of socio-cultural proximity that intellectuals expected to become a spiritual panacea for eastern societies after the removal of the Communism.
Meanwhile, EU executives developed a rather pragmatic outlook on what was happening in the East. Since the European Union lacks its démos, for EU officials, "the challenge is to find a European alternative to the axiomatic and hegemonic grip that the nation-state holds over the minds of the peoples of Europe" (Shore 2000, 17) . The European Commission has been well aware of the importance of information and media policies for the process of building a European identity since long before Maastricht. The Empire of Charlemagne, as a selected formative and conciliatory period in the history of the West, was presented in a TV series Charlemagne, Prince � cheval (1993) that was wholeheartedly and at the same time generously supported by the Commission. It could be taken as an inspiration, for the series amplifies the Franco-German early-medieval fusion. Yet the question that remains is how and to what extent this example can be followed in East Central Europe before the individual national histories in the region, as well as their perceptions, are harmonized.
In the Balkans, but also in the rest of East Central Europe, reconciliation à la France and Germany in the sphere of perceptions and interpretations of national histories is a difficult process. While the Ottomans seem to persist as traditional enemies to all of the Balkan states (with the frequent attempts of Maria Todorova to modify widespread negative perceptions), there remain many controversies between them, strengthened by old sins that accompanied the emergence and development of national states in the 19 th and 20 th centuries. The reasons for these enmities are historically complex and have caused problems in their accession process into the EU. As a result, past and present applicant states to the EU have each tended to make their case individually, while distancing themselves from the others and thus from their Easterness. This tendency is aptly described by Iver B. Neumann (2001, 153) :
Czech national identity depends on Slovakia as one of its others and the dichotomy European/ Asian is routinely invoked to demarcate the border between the two. Slovenian discourse not only underlines the 'Europeanness' of Slovenia but the Balkan character of Croatia. In Croatia one is told that Croatia is in Europe, whereas Serbia is definitely non-Europe. Serbs will underline that they and other traditionally Orthodox Christian states such as Russia and EU member Greece are European, while Bosnia, which insistently is referred to as a 'Muslim' state is not. In Hungarian discourse, it is, to put it politely, not uncommon to hear Romania represented as non-European. Romanians, in turn, stress their Europeanness by pointing to the lack thereof where Ukraine is concerned. In Ukraine one is told that Ukraine is Europe and Russia is most certainly non-European.
It would be too short-sighted to see those efforts to extricate themselves from the East with its alleged dark legacies of cruelty and backwardness as a cultural victory of the West. Such an attitude would further contradict the idea of a coherent, symbiotic identity of the European Union and both its legally and culturally equal citizens. The West should be well aware of the fact that the same primordial ethnic instincts can be found here as well. Finally, it can be postulated that both parts of Europe can be unified if the small collectives of individuals fit together. Such a fusion is made possible by the shared non-confrontational values based upon mutual respect. The European Commission has already managed to conceive and carry on with educational projects that are full of prodigious names originating in ancient Greece and the Renaissance such as Socrates, Erasmus, and Leonardo. There is probably an intentional avoidance of the names tied to the era of the Roman Empire commonly associated with the frequent use of physical force. Although it is quite understandably difficult to name a project after Caesar or Trajan, there is still a potential to be inspired by another, more civil example of Rome.
The Roman legionaries were undoubtedly soldiers first, but at the same time, they were citizens and settlers in the area of their service. Dawson and particularly Luttwak refer to the legionaries as combat engineers, rather than as ordinary rank and file foot soldiers, due to their immense capacity to build and construct (Dawson, 30, Luttwak 1987, 32) . The web of Roman military camps across western, central and southern Europe, as well as in the Near East, Asia Minor and in North Africa upon which many cities were built, together with the legacy of Roman law, still provide strong testimony of a civilization that has contributed in many ways to the emergence of modern Europe. Debra Johnson and Colin Turner once again stressed the fact that "Roman roads helped bind the different races and regions of the Empire together. To the extent that they helped unify and create the Roman Empire, Roman roads were instrumental in the creation of modern Europe" (Johnson and Turner 1997, 2) .
If the roads and the legions contributed to the extension of the Roman world, the question is how were the Romans able to keep their empire alive and attractive for so many centuries? Peter Turchin, while referring to Robert Putnam's elaborated ideas of social trust, finds the answer to that question in the high level of internal cohesiveness of the expanding Roman society on both vertical (hierarchical) and horizontal (social) levels (Putnam 1993 ). This solidarity was based upon common values that may today sound rather obsolete and even emotional. Virtus-virtue, Pietas-devotion, Clementia-clemency, Constantia-constancy and Dignitas-dignity are a few of those that helped the old and new Romans to succeed (Turchin, (155) (156) (157) (158) (159) .
Thus, if there exists a sincere desire for Europe to be united for the first time since the fall of the Roman Empire not by force of arms but on the basis of shared ideals and agreed common rules, the idea of a common identity can, metaphorically speaking, be encapsulated in the acronym L.E.G.I.O., where L stands for Lex and respect for Law, E for Educatio and general access to education, G for Gravitas-Gravity linked to incorruptible and accountable public politics, I for Indulgentia-translated as tolerance and moderation, and an O that stands for Opus as a synthesis of the joint efforts of both citizens and elites working in synergy for the benefit of individuals and thus also for the organic cohesiveness of society.
Four centuries of Western European political, economic and cultural dominance linked to the Treaty of Westphalia have brought Western Europe to the threshold of modernity with both its Eurocentric and polycentric aspects (Tully 2002 ). Yet the intellectual constructs, though sincere and well-meant, seem to be only a thin surface over more profound currents. If it is Weberian rationality with the genius of organization inherited from Rome together with modern technologies that impact the success of the project of a unified Europe in the West, the East's empathy and spirituality that gave life to many exceptional intellectual accomplishments, should be of no less importance in generating a common European identity. The body will obtain its spirit and the organism may thus become complete.
One of the aims of history is to analyze and credibly interpret the past. However, it is once again the practical steps taken by politicians and administrators that will respond to the question of whether the idea of a united Europe will have any impact on East Central Europe's long extrication from the rest of the Old Continent. The most recent example of Romania and Bulgaria entering the EU on January 1 st , 2007, while being labelled by the British media as "poor sisters" of the Union and even as barbarians, testifies that overcoming the "Limes" in people's minds will be much more difficult to achieve than the gradual abandonment of the Schengen system.
